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[redacted] 25X1

USSR-CHINA: Prospects for Talks

Soviet diplomats have hinted Moscow will offer concessions on border issues at the Sino-Soviet talks early next month.

[redacted] 25X1

Last week a Soviet Embassy officer implied to a US diplomat that the USSR is prepared to make concessions on border issues and to propose confidence-building measures. He declined to be more specific, however, and did not reply when asked if the confidence-building measures might include troop cuts. [redacted] 25X1

On the following day another Soviet diplomat stated Moscow had noted with interest pronouncements of the recent Chinese party congress placing the USSR and the US on equal footing. He acknowledged the congress had laid down "drastic conditions" for a normalization of relations but claimed Moscow will do what it can to achieve that goal. The Chinese have since continued to insist that Moscow meet these conditions. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

Comment: These statements almost certainly were meant to heighten US concern about the possibility of improved Sino-Soviet relations. They are more positive than the line President Brezhnev took in Baku, when he gave no hint of flexibility on any bilateral issue. [redacted] 25X1

The statements, however, are in keeping with the positive tone of recent Soviet commentaries on the Chinese congress. They may portend a conciliatory approach at the talks next month. [redacted] 25X1

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KENYA: Moi on the Defensive

Rising ethnic tensions following the coup attempt in August threaten to complicate plans announced by President Moi last week to deal with Kenya's economic problems. 25X1

Moi, a member of the small Kalenjin tribal group, has charged with treason several civilian members of the Luo--Kenya's second most influential tribe--in connection with the attempted takeover. One of them is the son of the country's predominant Luo political figure. 25X1

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Moi is considering a major cabinet shakeup to remove distrusted prominent members of the Kikuyu, Kenya's politically and economically most powerful tribe. Moi already has replaced several senior Kikuyu police officials. 25X1

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The President's strategy to shore up the economy includes plans to promote exports and to regain the confidence of the important Asian business community, which was hit hard by looting during the coup attempt. He also has announced renewed efforts to speed up foreign exchange disbursements for essential goods and to limit government spending. 25X1

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Comment: Moi already has cut most of his ties with the Luo, and treason convictions against its members could spur the tribe to agitate against the government.

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Moi's statements on the economy largely reiterate existing policies, but they represent the first indication in some time of high-level determination to deal with the worsening situation. They also seem intended primarily to convince Western aid donors--whose assistance is essential--that he is serious about economic reforms.

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